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The financial means of international terror and transnational organized crime 
organizations are analyzed. First, some short remarks about the organization of 
international terror organizations are made. Second and in a much more detailed 
way a literature review is provided about the financing of terrorist and transnational 
organized crime organizations, their sources and the various methods they use. 
Third, an attempt is made to estimate the financial means of terror organizations 
with the help of a latent estimation approach (MIMIC procedure). The figures show 
that Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have sufficient financial means. Fourth, 
some remarks are made about the negative effects of terror on the economy in 
highly developed countries and some strategies are presented to combat (the 
financing) of terrorism. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Until 2009, the development of the world economy and globalization made enormous 
gains in economic well-being possible, but this development has always contained risks, 
too. One of them is (transnational) terrorism and the global number of terrorist attacks, 
which rose from 208 in 2003 to ca. 864 in 2008
1. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 are an example of how extreme critics of globalization and of the western type of 
civilization fight violently against its economic advantages. The capacity of 
transnational organizations to generate world panic and cause intensive damage to a 
nation is an old and well known phenomenon. The anarchist movements at the end of 
the nineteenth century are a good example. For example, the late 1960s and 1970s were 
characterized by the rise of secular separatist and mostly left-wing terrorist groups, and 
since the early 1980s the emergence of religiously motivated terrorism especially 
extreme Islamist movements dominated the terrorist scene. In the latest years, 
transnational Terrorism has been returning to be a topic of growing interest for social 
scientists. First, drawing from Sandler et al. (1983) it is possible to espouse define 
terrorism as the “premeditated, threatened or actual use of force or violence to attain a 
political goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation
2”. Such a definition encompasses 
the four characteristics of terrorist activity as expounded by Shugart (2006), namely (i) 
the use of violence (or its threat) for political effect; (ii) a planned and calculated course 
of action; (iii) a boundless behavior outside the context of legitimate conduct of 
warfare; (iv) the effort to induce a disproportionate fear and feeling of insecurity among 
people, especially civilians
3. In the case of terrorism, national and transnational (usually 
religious fundamentalist) Al Qaeda-style transnational terrorism (see also Sedgwick 
(2007)) has three basic additional features: (1) Almost unlimited operational range of 
religious terrorism (global theatre); (2) Global support base, with spontaneously 
emerging local cells; (3) Broad concept of the enemy without limitations – meaning 
there is no overarching goal (Islamist global domination) but ‘only’ a common enemy 
(usually the USA and / or the highly developed Western world). In fact, the emergence 
transnational Islamist terrorism, has been also widely defined as ‘Global Jihadism’ or 
‘Al Qaedism’. In several countries, new terrorist groups have been emerging in the 
latest years. These groups may have or may have not been formally created by al-Qaeda 
but they have espoused al-Qaeda’s vision and strategy
4. In some cases, would-be 
terrorists have been also effectively defined ‘self starters’, i.e. groups perpetrating 
terrorist attacks on their own initiative (Kirby, 2007). This kind of phenomenon has 
been occurring in the last few years, thanks to the peculiar organization of Al Qaeda 
which had been defined as a ‘network’ or a ‘movement’, in order to highlight the nature 
of an entity less structured than traditional terrorist organisations. Caruso and Schneider 
                                                 
1 On the emergence of transnational terrorism, its financing and consequences for the economy see: 
Schneider (2004), Freytag et.al. (2009), Intriligator (2010), Lai (2007), Krueger and Malecková (2003), 
Addison und Murshed (2005),  Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., Justensen, M.K., Klemmensen, R. (2006), Cowen 
(2006), Sandler and Enders (2002, 2004, 2006), Li and Schaub (2004), Tavares (2004), Brück (2004), 
Alexander and Alexander (2002), as well as  Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks (2010). 
2 Sandler et al. (1983), p.37.  
3 The four characteristics have been recognized by scholars as the fundamental components of terrorism. 
On the debate to define and conceptualize terrorism see Weinberg et al. (2004) and Schmid (2004).   
4 See among others Rabasa et al. (2006) and Napoleoni (2005).  Page 3 of 34 
(2010) provide both a descriptive analysis and an empirical study on groups of 
transnational Islamist groups.  
The ultimate goal of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be the defeat of Western 
civilization; to unleash a ‘Global Jihad’. In fact, as noted above, Al-Qaeda is ‘only’ a 
brand with an extremely shallow hierarchy. Instead of being an organization it is rather 
a ‘virtual business corporation’; its slogan is that ‘dying is more important than killing’ 
and ’mass murder becomes a sacred act’, meaning that there are no limits to the choice 
of means. After the September 11, other attacks in Bali, Tunis, Istanbul, Madrid, 
London, Sharm el Sheikh among others have shown the global spread of the 
international conglomerate of Islamist terrorism. Some recurring features have been 
undercovered in literature: (i) a country with a free press allows that the news of a 
terrorist attack will immediately be spread worldwide. (ii) a location that is globally 
known and at which many important economic, political and religious institutions can 
can be severely hampered by terrorist attacks (tourism, stock exchange, economic life, 
religious institutions). (iii) The possibility to cause maximum damage within a short 
time-frame  
The craft of international Islamist terrorism is a modern form of terrorism, a 
mixture of Jihad and cynical calculations, aiming at demolishing open democracies and 
the Western way of life through terrorist attacks. This form of terrorism develops in the 
mind of a handful of analyzers and is then implemented by a couple of well-trained 
terrorists who were probably continuously instructed by their ‘mastermind’. Of course 
they were ready to put their lives on the line. Their own martyrdom is not the crowning 
finale, but the execution as such, and the assurance of gaining the world’s attention. It is 
obvious that the war of Islamistic terror is wearing on, and that those Al-Qaeda (and 
other terrorist organizations), who have lasting political, logistic and financial support 
can always cause shock and awe on a global scale. This approach of world-wide terror 
attacks perpetrated in an unpredictable pattern is pursued with the intention of spreading 
a permanent feeling of a state–of-emergency, which leads to increased distrust between 
different countries, regions and power blocks and restrains the freedom, democracy and 
pluralism of the Western lifestyle.  
The emergence of transnational terrorism also poses to both social scientists and 
security practitioners the question on how is terrorism and organized crime financed, 
and what do we know about this financing. In fact, the very fabric of transnational terror 
is underpinned by complex financial sources and linkages.  Moreover, in this respect, 
there is a growing evidence on the complex relationship between transnational terrorism 
and transnational organized crime. Since the mit-1970 the size of the legal international 
financial flows has grown to hundreds of billions of dollars a day. The same 
international financial system that allows commerce to flow freely between nations also 
provides terrorists with a way to move money around the globe within seconds. 
Transnational terrorism and organized crime have become a global problem, and 
therefore the effort to disrupt its financing ought to extend beyond borders in order to 
block the money wherever it is hidden and track it down wherever it moves.  
The main focus of this paper lies on providing a much more detailed answer on 
the financing of terrorism and organized crime.  
In this line a detailed analysis of the finances of terrorist and of organized crime 
organizations is crucial to fight terrorism by reducing their financial possibilities, so that 
the basis of their operations is at least limited. Such an analysis is the main goal of this 
paper. Chapter 2 provides an extensive literature review at about the kinds of terrorist Page 4 of 34 
and organized crime financing. In chapter 3 an estimation of the amount of financial 
flows of Islamistic terrorist organization is undertaken. In chapter 4 some implications 
and damages of transnational terrorism are shortly presented, and finally in chapter 5 
some policy conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
2.  Variety and diversity in terrorist financing: A Preliminary 
Literature Review 
 
The literature review is supposed to meet the two objectives: to widen the knowledge of 
this subject and the understanding of the main issues under debate and to focus on the 
literature closely related to the research topic. The body of literature on terrorist and 
organized crime financing, and their mechanisms is diverse and quite often very 
descriptive, hence here only some and important contributions are summarized, of 
course this selection is subjective, but - to the best of our knowledge - most areas are 
covered.  
Needless to say, The recent literature is influenced quite heavily by Al-Qaeda´s 
attacks in the U.S. in September 11, 2001. The case of Al Qaeda and Islamist terrorist 
groups is also peculiar to some extent. In fact, in this case of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, 
their economic and financial empire constitute a transnational financial engine, a 
considerable section of which is composed of legitimate businesses as already stated by 
Schneider (2002a, 2002b, 2004); Napoleoni (2005) and Comras (2005, 2007). Al-Qaeda 
is a terrorist network with international linkages that have been generally focused on a 
number of theatres of operation (sometimes in different countries), where they have 
managed to have money available. Their operations have been driven by a particular 
cause. Funding is generally specific, derived from sympathetic supporters, and 
especially from major crime activities. Contributions in the diaspora and monies from 
political and religious sympathizers have been important, too. 
The high flow of funds to terrorists was substantial during the cold war 
5 and 
scholars explain these flows as stemming from oil-rich regimes that began to pump 
large sums of money into the terrorist financial system (e.g. Libya in the 1970s and Iran 
under Ayatollah Khomeini, beginning in the 1980s).  
Hereafter we present some channels of funding for terrorist organizations with 
related sources in literature. As noted above, the body of literature on terrorist and 
organized crime financing, and their mechanisms is diverse and quite often very 
descriptive. Here only some and important contributions are summarized, of course this 
selection is subjective, but - to the best of our knowledge - most areas are covered. To 
summarise in advance, the section is split in two sub-sections: first the legitimate 
sources of funding are analyzed. Eventually, the illegal Sources of Terrorist Financing 
are presented. In this respect, some illicit businesses appear to be the field of overllaping 
and interaction between terrorists and organized crime syndicates. As point out above, 
this is not a novelty. IN fact, many of the terrorist groups of the Marxist-Leninist type of 
the 1960s and 1970s relied on various criminal activities – particularly kidnapping, bank 
                                                 
5 See, US.(1996). Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/overview.html. The United States actively 
promotes international cooperation in condemning state sponsorship of terrorism and in bringing 
maximum pressure to bear against state sponsors. The Secretary of State has designated seven countries 
as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Page 5 of 34 
robberies, and extortion – to supplement their funding. Other organizations including 
FARC in Colombia and Shining Path in Peru financed their activities through drug 
trafficking (compare Yepes (2008)). 
 
2.1 Legitimate Sources of Terrorist Financing 
 
Not all the financing received by terrorist comes from illegal activities. Yepes (2008) 
argues, that the legitimate financing is related to completely legal activities conducted 
by charities, diaspora, and firms. The 9/11 commission pointed out a core number of 
financial facilitators involved in raising, moving, and storing the money Al Qaeda used 
– from donors primarily in the Gulf Region but also from other countries around the 
world. According to Comras (2007) these groups used legitimate charities and 
businesses as covers to develop a substantial financial network. 
 
(1)  State Sponsors 
According to Yepes (2008) Afghanistan and Sudan have been sponsoring terrorist 
groups, e.g. it has been proven that the majority of companies and banks used by Bin 
Laden were located in Khartoum (Sudan) such as Faisal Islamic Bank, Ladin 
International, Taba investment Co. Ltd, Al Themar Al Mubaraka, Al Qudarat, Islamic 
Bank Al Shama. According to Yepes (2008) Al-Qaeda´s controlled companies in Africa 
included the holding company Wasi al AQuq, a Sudanese construction firm, Al-Hiraj, 
an ostrich farm, and shrimp boats in Kenya. In the Middlw East, the group has shares in 
the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank and large tracks of forest in Turkey; in Asia, it has 
agricultural holdings in Tajikistan; in Europe and the United States, holding companies, 
venture capital firms, banks, and import-export companies.
6 Further, the importance of 
the Al-Qaeda network in terms of correspondent banking can be seen by examining the 
case of the Al Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, in which foreign currency accounts 
were set up at Al Shamal for a number of the companies belonging to Bin Laden. 
Shamal´s correspondent banking relationships were with a variety of reputable banks 
such as CityBank and others, which is why Al-Qaeda was able to move money rapidly 
and without impediments around the world. 
 
(2)  Private (Individual and Corporate) Donors 
Kohlmann (2006) and Simpson (2007a, 2007b, p.10) conclude, that among the most 
important cases of the private donors involved in terrorist financing, is Mr. Al Rajhi and 
his family members, “they have been major donors to Islamic charities that are 
suspected by Western intelligence agencies of funding terrorism, according to CIA 
reports and federal-court filing by the US Justice Department. An endowment holding 
much of Saleh Al Rajhi´s wealth gives and indication of the scale. His Web site details 
nearly USD 50 Mio. in direct donations within the kingdom to Islamic causes and at 
least USD 12 Mio. in donations abroad. The overseas money went to aid embattle 
Muslims in Kosovo Chechnya and the Palestinian territories and to finance Islamic 
instruction”. According to Simpson (2007b), the U.S. Justice Department is 
investigating possible criminal tax-law violations by a Boston private-equity firm that 
manages hundreds of millions of dollars for Muslim investors in Europe and the Middle 
East and is affiliated with a Swiss investment group that U.S. authorities suspect of 
                                                 
6 These „facts“ are taken from Shahar,Y. (2001). Tracing Bin Laden´s money. www.ict.org; and Mintz, J. 
(1998). Bin Laden´s Finances are Moving Target. The Washington Post.  Page 6 of 34 
financing Islamic extremists. Some private corporate donors have been cited in Morigi 
(2004), and furthermore, Fried et al. (1975) concludes that private individual and 
corporate donors could be related to those individuals or enterprises that recycled 
Petrodollars in 1974. 
 
(3)  Ethnic Communities and Religious Financing 
According to Comras (2007) the factor explaining religious financing consists in a 
“Coranic Tax”, explaining the support offered by from the richest to the poorest, and it 
is obligatory to pay this within the Islamic community. Charity forms a very important 
part of Muslim law an tradition. Furthermore Comras (2007) argues, that Al Qaeda took 
advantage of it to solicit funds through collection boxes at mosques and Islamic centres. 
Simularily Napoleoni (2005, p.22) argues that the Mosque Network seems to provide 
financial support for the Jihad. He writes: “The Mosque Network is as efficient as ever 
and continues to be the main vehicle through which Islamist organizations, countries, 
state-shells, armed groups and their sponsors link up and do business with each other”. 
 
(4)  Charities 
Donations to NGOs and charities are perfectly legal in most countries, but the problem 
arises when some objectives of a NGO are not legal or are linked to a diversion of some 
of the funds legally received for illegal activities. Kohlmann (2006) and Raphaeli 
(2003) have highlighted how terrorist organizations have resorted to a variety of 
charitable as well as front and fraudulent organizations to mobilize financial resources 
for terrorists to carry out their actions. Raphaeli demonstrates the linkage between 
charity and terrorism in the case of Enaam Arnaout. Arnaout served in the office of an 
organization known as Maktab al Khidamat, run principally by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam 
and Osama bin Laden, for the purpose of providing logistical support to the Mujahideen 
(holy warriors) who were fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Croissant and 
Barlow (2007) reported in details the role of several chiarities in south east asia which 
were linked to the brother-in-law of Bin Laden, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. In 
particular, Khalifa directed a Saudia Arabian charity known as International Islamic 
Relief Organization (IIRO). Intelligence reports indicate that IIRO was used to support 
local terrorist operations throughout Southeast Asia. In addition, Khalifa also 
established a charity labeled as the International Relations and Information Center 
(IRIC). According to Abuza (2008), although most operations of Islamic charities in 
south Asia go to legitimate social work, it is undeniable that much of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s funding comes from charities. In particular, an estimated 15 to 20 percent of 
Islamic charity funds in Indonesia are diverted to Islamist activities.  
  However, the role of charities cannot be completely disentangled from other 
phenomena of state-support. In this respect, it must be underlined the role of the Muslim 
World League founded by Saudi Arabia in 1962 in order to support the propagation of 
Wahhabi version of Islam. According to Looney (2006), MWL supported institutions 
outside of Saudi Arabia, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East. In this context, Saudi public and private support has been estimated at over 
$75 billion during the last four decades. Many experts have drawn a link between this 
monetary effort whose ultimate goal was the spread of Wahhabi Islam and the rise in 
appeal of al Qaeda throughout the Muslim world. This point is also stressed in Levitt 
(2002) and Basile (2004). The latter, in particular, also highlights the role of other two Page 7 of 34 
long-lasting charities as the Benevolence International Foundation, and the Qatar 
Charitable Society (QCS).  
 
(5)   Legal Business 
 
In many cases, terrorist groups establish legitimate businesses which server both to 
cover illegal activities or to provide employment for their members. First, the truly 
transnational financial engine of the Al Qaeda terrorist group and its sympathizers 
continue to raise money through their own business activities. The legal business 
support to terrorist activities are noted by Napoleoni (2005), Ehrenfeld R., (2007), 
Gunaratna (2003), Schneider (2004, 2008a, 2008b), Millard (2006) and Comras (2007). 
Following Napoleoni (2005) and Mintz (1998) the Al-Qaeda group consists of the 
following companies among others: In Africa, a holding company, Wadi al Aqiq, a 
Sudanese construction firm, Al Hiraj, an ostrich farm and shrimp boats in Kenya; in the 
Middle East shares in the As-Shamil Islamic Bank and large tracks of forest in Turkey; 
agricultural holdings in Tajikistan in Europe and the United States, holding companies, 
venture capital firms, banks and import-export companies
7. The use of networks of 
companies and shell companies, shell bank, and offshore trusts to raise money, hide 
assets, and protect their identity of other financial contributors. Further, the importance 
of the Al-Qaeda network in terms of correspondent banking can be seen by examining 
the case of the Al Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, in which foreign currency 
accounts were set up at Al Shamal for a number of the companies belonging to Bin 
Laden. Shamal´s correspondent banking relationships were with a variety of reputable 
banks such as CityBank and others, which is why Al-Qaeda was able to move money 
rapidly and without impediments around the world. Further, the portfolio includes real 
estate in London, Paris and French Riviera; dairy business in Denmark; wood and paper 
industries in Norway; and hospital equipment in Sweden. Some scholars like Comras 
(2007) paid attention to the use of trusts by terrorists groups. Raphaeli (2003) reports 
the 3.7 USD million investment in New Jersey undertaken by an investment company 
known as BMI. One of the biggest investors in BMI was Yasin al-Qadi, a Saudi 
businessman from Jeddah considered by US authorities as a leading member of a global 
network that finances both Islamic good work and terrorism.. Another major investor was 
one of the leaders of Hamas, Moussa abu Marzuq. The government argued that the 
money transferred to BMI was used to finance terrorist organizations. 
 
2.2  The Illegal Sources of Terrorist Financing 
 
(1) Drug Trafficking 
A fundamental source of funding for terrorist groups is undoubtedly the narcotic 
industry. In particular as pointd out by Makarenko (2003a) illicit drug trafficking had 
always been the most common criminal activity terrorist groups have been involved in. 
Since the 1970s groups such as FARC, Basque  Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta 
Askatasuna – ETA), the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan – PKK) 
and Sendero Luminoso have all been involved in drug trafficking by well-documented 
evidence. This is nowadays also the case of Islamist groups. According to Yepes (2008) 
in May 2002 a report called “Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other 
                                                 
7 These „facts“ are taken from Shahar,Y. (2001). Tracing Bin Laden´s money. www.ict.org; and Mintz, J. 
(1998). Bin Laden´s Finances are Moving Target. The Washington Post.  Page 8 of 34 
extremist groups” was launched, prepared by the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress and the US Department of Defence. The report examined 
connections between extremist groups and narcotics trafficking in the following regions 
of Latin America: Triborder Region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Colombia, and 
Peru; in the Middle East: Lebanon, in Southern Europe (Albania and Macedonia); in 
Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and in East Asia: The Philippines. 
The recent account by Peters (2009) documented in details the strong ties between drug-
trafficking and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Paoli et al. (2007), also 
documented a detailed report on opium and heroin trafficking in Tajikistan.  According 
to Hardouin and Weichhardt (2006), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), has 
reportedly profited from the drugs smuggling out of Afghanistan and trafficking through 
Central Asia to both Russia and Europe. In brief, several Islamist groups in central asia 
have strong ties and involvement with drug trafficking (Cornell, 2005, 2006).  
 
(2) Oil Smuggling 
According to Johnson (2001) and Napoleoni (2005) another business is oil smuggling, 
where terror, criminal, and legitimate economies interact. Countries, where oil 
smuggling is a significant problem are Thailand, China, Russia, Cambodia, Iran and 
Tanzania. In all these countries oil smuggling earn for themselves significant profits, a 
substantial portion of which enters the laundering cycle. Oil smuggling is also related to 
arms trade.  
 
(3) Arms / Diamonds Trafficking 
Besides drugs trafficking according to Levi and Gilmore (2002), Schneider (2004, 
2008a, 2008b, 2009) and Yepes (2008) arms trafficking, and illegal diamonds trade are 
some of the most important illegal sources of funding of terrorist groups. Raphaeli 
(2003) reports the activity of some Al Qaeda operatives based in Liberia in gem 
business in Africa. Passas and Jones (2006), highlight the role of commodities in the 
financing of terrorist groups by covering many areas of legal and illicit trade, foremost 
among these diamonds. Even the linkage between Al Qaeda and illicit diamond market 
is analyzed.  In particular, in recent years some journalistic inquiries undercovered the 
links between al-Qaeda and the illicit trade in so-called "blood diamonds" bought from 
rebel groups in Africa
8. Hübschle A., (2007), reports also about Al qaeda interest in 
Tanzanite.  
 
The illicit arms trade demonstrates how comparatively easy it is to obtain false 
documentation accompanying arms shipments, especially end-user certificates. 
Inconsistent documentation requirements between states, and inefficient control in 
customs and port authorities in many states, have created an environment in which the 
illicit arms trade does not need to rely entirely on criminal activities: 
 
(1) When a state is involved in supplying arms to an embargoed state, payments often 
come in the form of commercial payments, such as an “oil for arms” deals to avoid 
bank involvement. 
(2) When an arms broker supplies an embargoed state of an insurgent/terrorist group, 
banks are often used because shipments are usually paid for in the form of letters of 
                                                 
8 See  the account by Lucy Jones on BBC news website http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2775763.stm Page 9 of 34 











































credit of by the direct transfer of hard-currency funds. In this case, money 
laundering becomes an important factor to ensure that the final arms destination is 
disguised. It is at this point that offshore banks play an important role because their 
facilities can ensure that any deposit or transfer is routed via several intermediary 
institutions; and deposits or transfers can be conducted in the name of a series of 
shell companies. Both of these techniques are used to hide the financial trail behind 
multiple administrative layers.   
(3) In situations where access to normal banking channels is very difficult (for example, 
as with most non-state actors), the financing of arms deals often takes a different 
form, most often through commodity exchanges. According to Smillie et al (2000), 
illicit arms transfers to Liberia and Sierra Leone were often financed with diamonds 
and timber concessions. 
 
In figure 2.1 the various channels of the infiltration of the transnational terrorist groups 
are summarized. Figure 2.1 concentrates on the use of financial resources and clearly 
demonstrates that the financial means / flows stand on 5 pillars ranking from donations 
to criminal activities. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Infiltration of the Transnational Terrorism in the Economy 
 
 
Source: Yepes (2008, p. 56) 
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2.3 The Informal Money Transfer (Hawala) System 
 
Especially during the 1990s, international concern grew over the “underground 
banking” and its abuse by serious offenders. Some academic works by Williams (2007),  
Passas (2003), and El-Quorchi (2003) have explained how informal systems operate, 
including their risks. The Informal Value Transfers Systems (IVTS) changes from 
region to region (Hawala or door-to door). Some scholars (Williams (2007), El-Quorchi 
(2003)) argue that hawala is vulnerable to criminal abuse, and like the other financial 
institutions, there is evidence that money derived from drug trafficking, illegal arms 
sales, body part trade, corruption, tax evasion, and all kinds of fraud have indeed moved 
through Hawala networks.  
Hawala banking  still takes place up to now and there is some of literature (Passas 
(2005), Bunt (2007)) about the Hawala banking system, where these authors point to the 
need for a regulation of the Hawala system. As argued, another way to transfer criminal 
financial flows is the Hawala banking. According to Bunt (2007), Hawala bankers
9 are 
financial service providers who carry out financial transactions without a license and 
therefore without government control. They accept cash, cheques or other valuable 
goods (diamonds, gold) at one location and pay a corresponding sum in cash or other 
remuneration at another location. Unlike official banks, Hawala bankers disregard the 
obligations concerning the identification of clients, record keeping, and the disclosure of 
unusual transactions, to which these official financial institutions are subject.  
To sum up, through the Hawala system that forms an integral part of the informal 
black market economy, underground bankers ensure the transfer of money without 
having to move it physically or electronically. When a payment needs to be made 
overseas, the underground banker will get in touch with a courier (or more recently 
using email, fax or phone) in that country informing him of the details of making the 
payment. If the recipient of the payment wishes to personally obtain the money, a code 
referring to the underground banker in the country of payment is given to the recipient. 
Such a system is almost untraceable since it leaves little if any paper trail. Transaction 
records are, if they are kept at all, being kept only until the money is delivered, at which 
time they are destroyed. Even when there is a paper or electronic record of sorts it is 
often in dialects and languages that serve as de facto encryption system.  
To our knowledge there is no comprehensive study on the global flows of money 
related to Hawala system. Wilson (2002) reports the difficulty to produce a quantitative 
assessment of Hawala transfers. In order to capture the magnitude of the phenomenon, it 
is necessary to refer to different sources. Table 2.1 below gathers some studies and the 
guessestimates and estimates are presented. According to Fischer (2002, p.17) the 
annual turnover of the Hawala banking system in the early 70ties was already 60 billion 
USD in the Arabic countries; e.g. six million foreign labourers in Saudi Arabia, who are 
sending home 40 billion USD a year home, make substantial use of the “ethnic” Hawala 
system. Fletcher and Baldrin (2002, p. 119) estimate with regard to Pakistan that 2.5 
billion  USD inherit the country in remittances via the Hawala system in 2001; the 
amount of money in India´s Hindi system was 50 billion USD in 1971. Despite the 
                                                 
9 Several traditional terms, like Hundi (India) and Fei-ch’ein (China) remind one of the fact that hawala 
banking came up independently in different parts of the world. At present, a range of other terms is used 
to refer to the same phenomenon, such as ‘informal banking’, ‘underground banking’, ‘ethnic banking’ or 
‘informal value transfer system’. Page 11 of 34 
growing competition by formal remittance services, the use of Hawala banking has 
probably not declined. According to a recent estimate by the IMF, (especially Asian) 
migrants transfer 100 billion dollars per annum to family members and relations in their 
country of origin through the official financial system. In addition, a similar amount of 
money is transferred in the form of goods, cash, and through underground bankers (IMF 
2005). In Somalia the estimate is between 500 millions and 1 billion in USD, (Viles, 
2008).  In Afghanistan, in the city of Herat, the total funds processed by Hawaladars is 
about 2.3 millions USD per month, 0.7 millions directly linked to the drug trade and 
US$ 1.3 million attributed to trade in legitimate goods. (Thompson, 2007). 
    
  
Table 2.1 . Hawala: Guessestimates and Estimates
Author/Source  country/area year/period
estimated amount of 
informal money flows 
Thompson (2007)  Afghanistan, city 
of Herat  unknown  2.3 million USD per 
month 
Fischer (2002)  Saudi Arabia unknown
40 billion USE per 
year 
Fletcher and Baldrin 
(2002)  Pakistan 2001
2.5 billion USD  
Viles (2008), Somalia   0.5-1 billion, USD 
Page and Plaza 
(2006)  global 2004 57.53 billion USD 
Omer (2004) Somalia    
Omer and El Koury 
(2004)  Somalia 2004
0.7-1 billion USD per 
year 
Syed Manzar Abbas 
Zaidi (2010) Pakistan unknown





2-5 billion USD per 
year 
Jessee (2006) Pakistan unknown




According to Bunt (2007), there are at least two different perspectives on Hawala 
banking. From the first point of view, Hawala banking is regarded as a centuries-old 
institution which has not yet outlived its usefulness. Low-income workers and migrant 
workers in particular supposedly put more trust in Hawala bankers than in formal banks. 
This viewpoint emphasizes the problem associated with subjecting Hawala banking to 
the same rules as formal banks. Regulation either through registration or licensing is 
seen as ineffective because it will simply push the system further into the underground, 
further complicating the already problematic task of controlling Hawala transactions 
(Razavy (2005), p.292; Perkel (2004), p.210-211)). Hence, Hawala banking might be 
the closest thing of a free market banking, without government regulation and it 
functioned well for centuries. One should clearly emphasize these advantages of Hawala 
banking when criticizing it. From the opposite point of view, Bunt (2007) argues that Page 12 of 34 
Hawala banking is described as ‘underground banking’, a system that flies under the 
radar of modern supervision of financial transactions. Underground banking is 
considered a threat to the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures and the fight 
against terrorist financing. To prevent underground bankers from becoming a safe haven 
for criminals and terrorists, they should be subject to the standard regulations regarding 




3.  Terrorist Financing and Money laundering  
 
In general it is very difficult to identify trends in the Money Laundering/ Terrorist 
Financing (ML/TF) area, because the activity of ML/TF cannot be neither observed nor 
recorded in statistics
11. Intelligence, law enforcement investigations, and criminal 
prosecution try to identify trends in connection with ML/TF. According to the Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies (FATF-GAFI 2005), the ML/FT 
activity could be classified by: 
 
(i)   predicate or other related offence, 
(ii)  country or region, 
(iii) financial sector involved, 
(iv)  development stage of the financial market, and 
(v)   weak points or vulnerabilities in AML/CFT system. 
 
The 9/11 terrorists took advantage of the lack of a financial system control, which gave 
them the ability to transmit and receive money with relative anonymity and to find the 
financial resources to carry out their plans of Al-Qaeda inspired groups and other 
terrorist organizations. The terrorist financing mechanisms that have emerged since 
September 2001 are characterized according to Geraldo at al (2007), p. 11) by “the use 
of formal and informal global financial system that terrorists can easily manipulate.” 
According to the evolution of terrorist financing explained above, it has been argued by 
Giraldo et al. (2007) and in the Wilton Park Report (2007) that the intelligence process 
to fight against terrorist financing should combine expertise from different fields to 
detect the various indicators and trends. The experts according the Wilton Park 
Conference point out that the current indicators and trends of terrorist financing are the 
important challenges that face international cooperation. The following list sums up the 
constraints presented by intelligence agencies to follow the money trail: 
(1) The need for examining financial transactions will oblige national security 
intelligence personnel and law enforcement agents to deal with accountants and 
banking and financial experts if they want to follow the money trail. 
(2) Recognizing that it is necessary to analyze the suspicious activities reports 
collected as well as to share this information between Financial Intelligence 
Units of the various countries. 
(3) Information should be disseminated at a local level because terrorist 
organizations are engaged in organized crime networks. 
                                                 
10 Compare also Richard (2005) and Rider (2004). 
11 Compare here Bierstecker (2002), Costa (2005), Pieth (2005) and Schneider (2008a, 2008b). Page 13 of 34 
(1) The intelligence process against terrorist financing requires the cooperation of 
governments, and that of the multilateral institutions dealing with financial 
integrity and transnational intelligence. 
 
3.1 Some Common Aspects of Transnational Crime and Terrorist Groups Financing 
 
Similarities between transnational crime and terrorist groups are fully described by 
Schneider (2008a, 2008b, 2009), Sanderson (2004); Gilmore (2004), Shelley (2005); 
Wilkinson (2005); Makarenko (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c), Bovenkerk and Abou 
Chakra (2004), Bell (2003) and Koh (2006). They are: 
 
(1) Both are generally rational actors, 
(2) both use extreme violence and the treat of reprisals, 
(3) both use kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion, 
(4) both operate secretly, though at times publicly in friendly territory, and  
(5) both defy the state and the rule of law(except when there is state sponsorship). 
 
According to Masciandaro (2004, 2005, 2006), Picarelli (2006), Shelly (2007) and 
Yepes (2008) the issues of transnational crime, money laundering, and the financing of 
terrorism have the following common aspects: 
 
(1) They can use wire transfers or electronic payment systems to move money 
through multiple jurisdictions. 
(2) They engage in a variety of criminal activities like traffickers and other criminal 
syndicates. However, the line is now becoming less defined, since terrorists 
often resort to crime and cooperate with criminals in generating money, 
obtaining arms and explosives. According to Makarenko (2003a, 2003b) 
criminals are likely to use terrorism tactics and random violence in pursuits of 
revenues: 
(i)  Drug, arms and human trafficking
12, trading in precious stones (demands) 
and other commodities,  
(ii) smuggled cash, cigarettes, and other addicted good, 
(iii)counterfeit, goods, and 
(iv)   kidnapping. 
 
Both groups benefit from: shell companies, offshore bank facilities. Money laundering 
experts
13, for instance, argue that both groups use a technique known as a “starburst”: A 
deposit of dirty money is made in a bank with standing instructions to wire it in small, 
random fragments to hundreds of other bank accounts around the world, in both onshore 
and offshore financial centres. Tracking down the money becomes very difficult, since 
                                                 
12 Makarenko (2003a), p. 66 writes:”The most common criminal activity terrorist groups have been 
involved in is the illicit drug trade. Since the 1970s groups such as FARC, Basque  Fatherland and 
Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna – ETA), the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan – 
PKK) and Sendero Luminoso have all been linked to the drug trade by well-documented evidence. Since 
the early 1990s additional groups such as Hizbullah and the IMU have also realised the financial utility of 
participating in the illicit drugs trade. It is alleged that Hizbullah continues to protect heroin and cocaine 
laboratories in the Bekaa Valley; and evidence strongly indicated that the IMZ – prior to the Afghan 
campaign – controlled drug trafficking routes into Central Asia from northern Afghanistan”. 
13 See: Koh (2004),  Schneider (2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2009); and Masciandaro (2004). Page 14 of 34 
getting legal permission to pursue bank accounts in multiple jurisdictions can take 
years. Napoleoni (2005, p.33) argues, “You build a long chain of representative offices 
at the end of which there is a shell company registered offshore, and you are lucky, if 
you get to the end of the chain. Financial investigations often run into a blind alley 
always through, somewhere, in a tiny offshore office”. 
 
3.2 The Main Differences between Organized Crime and Terrorist Groups 
Financing 
 
It is obvious that there are many differences between organized crime and terrorist 
groups with respect to financing. To some extend it is possible to make a distinction in 
the roots and operational characteristics: 
 
(1) Terrorist Financing 
A number of scholars (Napoleoni, Krueger, Yepes) explain terrorism through 
religion, development of socio-political causes, and even the economy is 
sometimes important. Typical operational characteristics of terrorist groups and 
their financing are: 
(i)  low costs / low technology made possible some recent attacks with a 
great impact on human lives, on nations, and on economies (e.g. 9/11 
New York, Madrid, London and Mumbai). 
(ii) Flexible and decentralized organizations with independent decisions and 
actions. 
(iii)Common ideology with indiscriminate targets (no purpose related to 
profit). 
(iv)  Financial means are needed to plan and execute (future) terrorist attacks; 
there is only a limited need to hide assets. 
(v) Self-financing with possible criminal activities but also obtaining money 
from legal sources (e.g., donations and charity organizations). Terrorists 
use different sources of money, depending on their motivations, their 
mode of operations, and the resistance they face from law enforcement. 
Quite often the money starts off clean, becoming “dirty” only when the 
terrorist crime is committed later on. Hence, terrorist enterprises use 
clean money to commit crimes. The money sometimes consists of legally 
obtained resources that are used for a limited period of time and of 
smaller amounts of money to prepare attacks. 
 
(2) Organized (Transnational) Crime Turnover and Money Laundering
14 
Dirty money is earned through various criminal activities, like drug, weapon and 
human trafficking. How much illicit crime money in all its forms can be 
observed? Baker (2005) estimates the illicit money to range between US$ 1.0 
and 1.6 trillion a year. This estimate has been adopted by the World Bank. 
Moreover, Baker estimates that half – US$ 500 to 800 a year – comes out of 
                                                 
14 For a detailed analysis see Schneider (2008a, 2008b and 2009), Schneider and Windischbauer 
(2008), Schneider, Dreer and Riegler (2006), and Takats (2007).
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developing and transitional economies. These are countries that often have the 
weakest legal and administrative structures, the largest criminal gangs of drug 
dealers, and, far too often, economic and political elites who want to take their 
money out by any means possible. 
 
In table 2.1, the global flows from illicit activities worldwide are shown. In 
cross-border illicit financial flows, the proceeds of bribery and theft are the 
smallest, at only perhaps three percent of the global total. Criminally generated 
funds account for some 30 to 35 percent of the global total. Commercially tax 
evading money, driven in particular by abusive transfer pricing and faked 
transactions as well as mispricing is by far the largest component, at some 60 to 
65 percent of the global total.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Global Flows from Illicit Activities worldwide, years 2000/2001 
Global Flows  Low (US$ bn)  %  High (US$ bn)  % 
Drugs 120  11%  200  12.5% 
Counterfeit goods  80  7.5%  120  7.5% 
Counterfeit currency  3  0.2%  3  0.2% 
Human trafficking  12  1.1%  15  0.9% 
Illegal arms trade  6  2.0%  10  0.6% 
Smuggling 60  5.6%  100  6.3% 
Racketeering 50  4.7%  100  6.3% 
Crime subtotal  331 31.2% 549 34.3%
Mispricing 200  18.9%  250  15.6% 
Abusive transfer 
pricing 
300 28.3%  500 31.2% 
Fake transactions  200  18.9%  250  15.6% 
Commercial subtotal  700 66.0% 1,000 62.5%
Corruption 30  2.8%  50  5.1% 
Grand Total  1,061  100.0%  1,599  100.0% 
Source: Baker (2005), p. 175. 
 
In the next step the main characteristic of money laundering is to make dirty money 
appear legal (compare Walker (2000, 2004, 2007)). There are numerous methods of 
money laundering; in table 2.2 the 12 most important methods are shown. Which of 
these methods is mostly used, depends on the crime activity and on the specific 
institutional arrangements in a country where the criminal money is “earned”. For 
example, in the drug business method, business ownership, is quite often used. In the 
drug business and in big cities smaller amounts of cash are earned by drug dealers in a Page 16 of 34 
lot of different spaces, which they infiltrate in to cash intensive operations such as 
restaurants which are especially well suited for money laundering purposes. But also 
cash deposits (the so called smurfing method) or illegal gambling is quite often used. 
Obviously, these methods clearly show, there are a number of ways to launder money. It 




Table 2.2: The Methods of Money Laundering
1) 
1)  Wire transfers 
or electronic 
banking 
The primary tool of money launderers to move funds around in 
the banking system. These moves can conceal the illicit origins 
of the funds or just place the money where the launderers need 
them. Often the funds go through several banks and even 
different jurisdictions. 
2)  Cash deposits  Money launderers need to deposit cash advances to bank 
accounts prior to wire transfers. Due to anti-money-laundering 
regulations they often ‘structure’ the payments, i.e. break down 
large to smaller amounts. This is also called ‘smurfing’. 
3)  Informal value 
transfer 
systems (IVTS) 
Money launderers need not rely on the banking sector, other 
transfer providers, such as the hawala or hindi are readily 
available to undertake fund transfers. These systems consist of 
shops (mainly selling groceries, phone cards or other similar 
items), which are also involved in transfer services. IVTSs 
enable international fund transfers, as these shops are present in 
several jurisdictions. 
4)  Cash 
smuggling 
Money launderers might mail, Fedex or simply carry cash with 
them from one region to another, or even to different 
jurisdictions. 
5)  Gambling  Casinos, horse-races and lotteries are ways of legalizing funds. 
The money launderer can buy (for ‘dirty’ cash) winning tickets 
– or in the case of casinos chips – and redeem the tickets or the 
chips in a ‘clean’ bank check. Afterwards, the check can be 
easily deposited in the banking sector. 
6)  Insurance 
policies 
Money launderers purchase single premium insurance (with 
dirty cash), redeem early (and pay some penalty) in order to 
receive clean checks to deposit. Longer term premium payments 
might make laundering even harder to detect. 
7)  Securities  Usually used to facilitate fund transfers, where underlying 
security deals provide cover (and legitimate looking reason) for 
transfers. 
8)  Business 
ownership 
Money might be laundered through legitimate businesses, 
where laundering funds can be added to legitimate revenues. 
Cash-intensive operations, such as restaurants, are especially 
well suited for laundering. 
9)  Shell 
corporations 
Money launderers might create companies exclusively to 
provide cover for fund moves without legitimate business 
activities. 
10)  Purchases  Real estate or any durable good purchases can be used to Page 17 of 34 
launder monies. Typically, the item is bought for cash and 
resold for clean monies, like bank checks. 
11)  Credit card 
advance 
payment 
Money launderers pay money in advance with dirty money, and 
receive clean checks on the balance from the bank 
12)  ATM 
operations 
Banks might allow other firms to operate their ATMs, i.e. to 
maintain and fill them with cash. Money launderers fill ATMs 
with dirty cash, and receive clean checks (for the cash 
withdrawn) from the bank.  
1) Source: Unger (2007, pp.195-196). 
 
Schneider (2008a, 2008b) estimates with the help of the MIMIC estimation procedure 
that money laundering from organized transnational crime has increased from 1995 
USD 273 billion (1,33% of official GDP) to USD 603 billion (or 1,74% of the official 
GDP) in 2006 for 20 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Spain and the United States). On a world 
wide basis in 2006 USD 600 billion are estimated to be laundered coming only from the 
drug (crime) business. 
 
Unger (2007) estimates the amount of laundered money and their top 20 destinations, 
which is shown in table 2.3 over the time span 1997-2000. Here two estimates are 
presented, one by Walker (1999, 2007) and one by the IMF. The Walker figure is with 
2.850 billion USD much larger then the IMF figure with 1.500 billion USD (both 
figures are for the year 2005). Walker’s figures have been criticized as much to high 
which was one reason why the IMF estimates have been choosen, too. Table 2.3 clearly 
shows that two thirds of worldwide money laundering was sent to the top 20 countries 
listed. One should realize, that most of these countries are very established, well 
developed and have a quite sizeable legal/official economies. What is also amazing, that 
there are only a few microstate offshore countries (OFCS) and tax heavens among them 
(Cayman Islands, Vatican City, Bermuda and Liechtenstein)
15. The majority of 
countries that attract money laundering flows are economic prepotencies at not tiny 
unimportant countries. The United States has the largest worldwide share of money 
laundering of almost 19%, followed by the Cayman Islands (4,9%), Russia (4,2%), Italy 
(3,7%), but also smaller countries like Switzerland (2,1% of worldwide money 
laundering), Liechtenstein (1,7%) and Austria (1,7%) are also quite attractive. If one 
takes the lower IMF value for Austria, Switzerland and in the United Kingdom, roughly 
5.5 % of the total amount is laundered, which comes close to roughly 10% of official 
GDP of the three countries However, it should be clearly stated that it is not clear 
whether this money is only laundered in these countrie or stays in these countries. It 
might leave these countries when it was laundered. In general, table 2.3 clearly 
demonstrates, how important the amount of laundered money is and that two thirds of 
this are concentrated in 20 countries.  
Bagella, Busato and Argentiero (2009, pp.881) use a theoretical two-sector 
dynamic general equilibrium model to measure ML for the United States and the EU-15 
                                                 
15 Compare also Masciandaro (2005, 2006), Masciandaro and Portolano (2004), Zdanowicz (2009), 
Truman and Reuter  (2004), and Walker and Unger (2009): Page 18 of 34 
macro areas over the sample 2000:01-2007:01 at a quarterly frequency. Their series are 
generated through a fully micro-founded dynamic model, which is appropriately 
calibrated to replicate selected stochastic properties of the two economies. Their model 
(and the analysis) has a short run perspective, and for this reason, the paper discusses 
the stochastic properties of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. Bagella et al. (2009, 
pp.881) got the following results: First the simulations show that ML accounts for 
approximately 19 percent of the GDP measured for the EU-15, while it accounts for 13 
percent in the US economy, over the sample 2000:01-2007:04. Second, the simulated 
ML appears less volatile than the corresponding GDP. As regards the EU-15 macro 
area, the simulated statistics suggest that ML volatility is one-third of the GDP ones; for 
the US economy, the same statistics produce a figure of two-fifths. Considering these 
estimates one must admit, that they are pretty high and unfortunately no consistent 
check was done by Bagella et. al, whether such figures are plausible. 
 
Table 2.3: The Amount of Laundered Money and Top 20 Destinations of Laundered 
Money, Year 2005
1) 





2.85 trillion US$ 
Amount in billion 
US$ 
IMF estimate of 1.5 
trillion worldwide 
Amount in billion 
US$ 
1 United  States  18.9%  538,145  283,500 
2 Cayman  Islands  4.9%  138,329  73,500 
3 Russia  4.2%  120,493  63,000 
4 Italy  3.7%  105,688  55,500 
5 China  3.3%  94,726  49,500 
6 Romania  3.1%  89,595  46,500 
7 Canada  3.0%  85,444  45,000 
8 Vatican  City  2.8%  80,596  42,000 
9 Luxembourg  2.8%  78,468  42,000 
10 France  2.4%  68,471  36,000 
11 Bahamas  2.3%  66,398  34,500 
12 Germany  2.2%  61,315  33,000 
13 Switzerland  2.1%  58,993  31,500 
14 Bermuda  1.9%  52,887  28,500 
15 Netherlands  1.7%  49,591  25,500 
16  Liechtenstein 1.7% 48,949  25,500 
17 Austria  1.7%  48,376  25,500 
18 Hong  Kong  1.6%  44,519  24,000 
19 United  Kingdom  1.6%  44,478  24,000 
20 Spain  1.2%  35,461  18,000 
 SUM  67.1%  1,910,922  1,006,500 
1) Source Unger (2007, page 80) 
 
From a global perspective for 2000, the IMF (2003, 2001) as well as the World Bank 
estimate that 2-4% of the world gross domestic product (GDP) stem from illicit 
(criminal) sources. Agarwal and Agarwal (2006) estimate from economic intelligence Page 19 of 34 
units, that global money laundering amounts to more than 2.0 to 2.5 trillion US$ 
annually or about 5-6% of World GDP in 2006 (4,444 trillion US$ in 2006) to be 
contrasted against an observed figure of US$ 500 billion to one trillion in 2004 from the 
same authors (Agarwal and Agarwal (2004)). Recent IMF estimates on money 
laundering by the drug traffickers, who “introduce” the proceeds gained through the 
selling of drugs into the legitimate financial market, amount to 600 billion annually. The 
IDB (2004) reaches the conclusion that for Latin America a rough estimate appears to 
be somewhere between 2.5 and 6.3 % of annual GDP of Latin American countries.  
In their latest study again Walker and Unger (2009, page 821) undertake an attempt, 
measuring global money laundering and the proceeds of transnational crime that are 
pumped through the financial system worldwide. They criticize that methods such as 
case studies, proxy variables, or models for measuring the shadow economy all tend to 
under- or overestimate money laundering. They present a model, which ia a gravity 
model which makes it possible to estimate the flows of illicit funds from and to each 
jurisdiction in the world and worldwide. This “Walker Model” was first developed in 
1994, and used and updated recently. The authors show that it belongs to the group of 
gravity models, which have recently become popular in international trade theory. 
Using triangulation, they demonstrate, that the original Walker Model estimates are 
compatible with recent findings on money laundering. Once the scale of money 
laundering is known, its macroeconomic effects and the impact of crime prevention, 
regulation and law enforcement effects on money laundering and transnational crime 
can also be measured. Walker and Unger (2009, p. 849-850) conclude, that their model 
still seems to be the most reliable and robust method to estimate global money 
laundering, and thereby the important effects of transnational crime on economic, social 
and political institutions. Rightly they argue, that the attractiveness and distance 
indicator in the Walker model are a valid first approximation, but are still quite ad hoc. 
A better micro-foundation for the Walker Model will be needed in the future. For this, 
the behavior of money launderers, and in particular what makes them send their money 
to a specific country, is important. Hence, Walker and Unger (2009, p. 850) argue that 
an economics of crime micro-foundation for the Walker Model would mean that, 
similarly to international trade theory, behavioral assumptions about money launderers 
have to be made. The gravity model must be the (reduced form) outcome of their 
rational calculus of sending their money to another country and possibly getting caught, 
but potentially making large profits. 
 
4.  The Amount of Financial Flows and the Ways of Financing 
Islamistic International Terror Organizations 
 
The financing of cells of (Islamistic) terrorist organizations is conducted independently, 
and financial transactions are deliberately targeted at single cells in order to avoid 
moving larger sums and calling attention. Usually these transactions are carried out with 
the help of traditional trading companies (for example within the scope of exporting 
honey in the Middle East). They are camouflaged to an extent that makes tracing them 
nearly impossible. This form of transactions is barely distinguishable from normal Page 20 of 34 
import/export or other monetary dealings.
16 Hence, in this chapter an attempt is made to 
estimate the amount of financial flows and to analyse the ways of financing 
international terror organizations. Before showing the results the estimation procedure is 
shortly described. 
 
4.1 Estimation Procedure (latent estimator MIMIC approach) 
As the size of financial flows of the Islamic terrorist groups is an unknown (hidden) 
figure, a latent estimator approach using a MIMIC (i.e. multiple indicators, multiple 
causes estimation) procedure is applied. This method has quite successfully been used 
to estimate the size of the shadow economy and is now shortly described.
17) This 
estimation procedure is called the “model approach” which explicitly considers the 
multiple causes of as well as multiple indicators of the hidden variable. The method is 
based on the statistical theory of unobserved variables, which consider multiple causes 
and multiple indicators of the phenomenon (size of the shadow economy, size of the 
financial flow of (Islamistic) terror organizations). A factor-analytic approach is used to 
measure the hidden economy (here size of financial flows of the terrorist organizations) 
as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of 
structural equations within which the “unobserved” variable cannot be measured 
directly. The MIMIC (multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model consists in general of 
two parts, the measurement model links the unobserved variables to observed 
indicators. The structural equations model specifies causal relationships among the 
unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved variable, the size of the 
financial flows of (Islamistic) terrorist organizations. It is assumed to be influenced by a 
set of indicators for these financial flows, thus capturing the structural dependence of 
these financial flows on variables that may be useful in predicting its movement and 
size. The interaction over time between the causes Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., k), the size of these 
financial flows Xt, and the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 2, ..., p) is shown in figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: Development of the shadow economy (size of financial flows of Islamic 

















                                                 
16 See: Schneider (2004, 2002a, 2002b). 
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4.2 The Estimation Results 
As causes for the estimation of the size of the financial flows of the Islamistic terrorist 
groups we have the following variables: 
 
(1) number of active members and active supporters (positive sign expected); 
(2) tribute payments from Islamic countries (positive sign expected); 
(3) financial flows from wealthy people and from Islamic religious organizations in 
Islamic countries (positive sign expected); 
(4) illegal amount of diamond trading (positive sign expected); 
(5) illegal amount of drug trading (positive sign expected); and 
(6) GDP per capita in Islamic countries (negative sign expected). 
 
As indicators we use the following variables:  
(1) the cash flows in Islamic countries (positive sign expected); 
(2) the rate of GDP adjusted for the means of all Islamic countries (negative sign 
expected), and 




In Figure 3.2 the estimation (MIMIC approach) of the financial flows (unobserved / 
latent variable) of over 8 terrorist organizations and over the period 1999 to 2006 is 
shown. If we first turn to the causal variables, the number of active members and 
number of supporters, the tribute payments from Islamistic countries, the financial flows 
from wealthy people and from Islamic religious organizations have the expected sign 
and the estimated coefficients are highly statistically significant. This is also true for the 
causal variable, amount of illegal drug trading, which has the expected sign and is 
statistically significant. The amount of illegal diamond trading and GDP per capita in 
Islamic countries have the expected signs, but are not statistically significant using the 
usual confidence intervals. Hence, out of the 6 variables 4 turn out to be highly 
statistically significant. If I now turn to the indicator variables, all 3 have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. Starting with the variable cash currency flows in 
Islamic countries and continuing to the one, the amount of currency trading between 
Islamic countries as well as the rate of GDP. This estimation shows, that there is 
systematic relationship between the major courses of financial sources for the financing 
of Islamistic terrorist groups and important indicator variables. 
 
The MIMIC method has the disadvantage, that one gets only relatively estimated values 
and not absolute ones, hence one has to calibrate these values with the help of other 
estimations into absolute ones. Doing this
18 we achieve the following two results. The 
main results are shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2. The first can be demonstrated in the case 
of Al-Qaeda.  
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
 
                                                 
18 See here Schneider (2008a, 2008b, 2009) Page 22 of 34 
Considering table 3.1 one realizes that over 1999-2004 the annual financial flows (i.e. 
the budget) of Al-Qaeda varies between 20 to 50 million USD per year. What is the 
origin/source of these annual financial flows? This is shown in the second part of table 
3.1. The drug business (mainly transporting drugs) contributes 30-35%, donations and 
tribute payments of governments of wealthy individuals, and of religious groups vary 
between 35-50% and classical crime activities (i.e. blackmail and mostly kidnapping) 
contribute between 10-15%.   
In table 3.2 a rudimentary overview is given about the preliminary results of the 
financial flows of Arabic and Islamistic terror organizations. Table 3.2 shows that the 
financial flows of these Islamistic terror organizations are quite small but (compared to 
the ones of the organized crime scene) but that they have enough financial means to 
train and to equip well their active terrorist members in order to create a maximum of 
destruction. If one compares these financial flows with the overall figure of “dirty or 
crime money” given by the IMF these financial flows of Islamic terrorist organizations 
are of minor importance with respect to magnitude: The IMF calculates that the total 
sum of “dirty money” being whitewashed through the financial system ranks between 
500 billion USD and 1,500 billion USD a year, which amounts up to 3% and 5% of the 
gross world product. The financial flows of Islamic terrorist organizations range 




Table 3.1:  The Financial Flows and the Kind of Finances of Al-Qaeda and 
other Terror Organizations  
 
Annual financial flows (budget) of Al-Qaeda 
(Average 1999-2006) 
20-50 mill. $ 
Ways of financing of terror organisations (using the example 
of Al-Qaeda) 
 
Drug business (mainly transporting drugs)  30-35% 
Donations from governments or wealthy individuals or 
religious groups 
20-30% 
Tribute payments from Islamic countries  15-20% 
Number of active members and supporters (including 
classical crime activities like kidnapping, blackmail, etc.) 
10-15% 
SUM  75 – 100% 













Financial flows from wealthy  
people and from Islamic religious 
organizations in Islamic countries
Amount of illegal diamond trading
Amount of illegal drug trading
Latent Variable: 
Size of the financial  
flows of the Islamistic
terrorist groups
2 = 44.3; 
d.f. = 32; n = 200
 1=0.232 
(2.74)** 











Amount of currency  
trading in Islamic countries
Rate of GNP (adjusted for the 
mean of all Islamic countries)








Figure 3.2: Estimation (latent estimator approach) of the financial flows (budget) of Islamistic terrorist groups using causes (determinants) 
and traces (indicators), MIMIC estimation procedure, combined cross section and time series over 8 Islamistic terrorist org. and over 1999 to 
2006 
Source: Own calculations and Schneider (2010). Page 24 of 34 
 








Current financial flows 
(annual budget)  
 
Average over 1999-2006
Al-Qaeda  1500-3000  20-50 mill. $ 
Front Islamique du Salut (Algeria)  ca. 400  ca. 5 mill. $ 
Hamas  ca. 2000  ca. 10 mill. $ 
Hizbullah  ca. 10.000  ca. 50 mill. $ 
Arabic Mujahedin (terror) organisations:     
- Irak  ca. 800  ca. 5 mill. $ 
- Iran  ca. 600  ca. 5 mill. $ 
- Libyan  ca. 600  ca. 10 mill. $ 
- Egypt (Egyptian Islamic Jihad; most 
likely united with Al-Qaeda; 
islam./arab.) 
ca. 600  ca. 8 mill. $ 
 




5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper it is firstly and shortly elaborated how Islamistic terrorist organizations work and 
how effective they can be. Second and in a much more detailed way a literature review is 
provided about the finances of terrorist and organized crime organizations, their sources and 
the various methods they use. Also a short discussion is provided with respect to the 
interaction of organized crime and terrorist organizations. Then in part 3 with the help of a 
latend estimate approach it is investigated how large the financial flows of some Islamistic 
terrorist organizations are and what are their ways of financing. Finally in part 4 some short 
remarks are made about the economic implications and damages of transnational terrorism, 
which is really sizeable.  
 
5.1 Strategies to Tackle the Financing of Terrorism 
On the basis of the results of this paper, a double step strategy is needed to overcome the 
failings and discrepancies between countries in building a more coordinated global strategy 
against the financing of terrorism and of organized crime. 
 
In the first step, the states should recognize that they should pay much more attention to the 
adequate criminalization of terrorist financing, to establish a clear approach towards informal 
transfer systems, to establish consistent freezing of assets and an approach towards 
international legal cooperation. This strategy should contain the following aspects / measures: 
(1)  achieve a common definition of terrorism and a definition of the financing of 
terrorism; 
(2)  take into account the increasing global nexus between crime and terror and its negative 
effect on the global economy; Page 25 of 34 
(3)  create a global index of country vulnerability to terrorist financing to improve the 
capacity of international community to monitor and control key safe havens used by 
terrorist financiers; 
 
In a second step states / countries should be able to redesign their strategy against terrorism 
finances taking into account not only previous weaknesses but also a recognisition that one 
size model does not fit all, especially when there are cash economies and failed states 
involved. The following points should be taken into account when building up the new 
strategy: 
(1)    The traditional risk-based approach to combat the financing of terrorism must be 
redefined and newly implemented, because a high number of recommendations from 
international bodies have created a number of requirements that overlap efforts and 
undermines efficiency. A high level interagency is needed to harmonize the national 
efforts on combating of the financing of terrorism. 
(2)   The policy makers should design a strategy to manage and map different levels of 
analysis (EU, National and Cross Borders); then they should think about determining 
the main information requirements how to combat the financing of terrorism. 
(3)  This change of strategy would compel the international organizations to provide clear 
policy guidance to the private sector. There is a question of how much information law 
enforcement agencies should get from financial sector in order to maximize the 
efficiency of data collection, and thus contribute to keeping financial institutions 
informed of the new patterns, indicators and typologies relevant to fighting against 
terrorist financing. The complexity of terrorist financing requires a coordination of 
public and private sectors, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies need to 
advice financial institutions on what kind of data they need. 
(4)   In the case of prosecutions, one of the largest challenges law enforcement faces, is in 
compiling evidence around a terrorism case. There is a large amount of information 
that will never be seen in a court room, because it cannot be verified. There is a 
conflict between collecting evidence for courts (law enforcement) and collecting 
information to inform government (intelligence agencies). 
(5)  More and better information exchange is another fundamental component of 
combating the financing terrorism. There still remain many legal barriers when two or 
more jurisdictions are involved and when gathering information in one country is a 
criminal offence if data privacy and bank secrecy laws remain in place. This poses 
many restrictions on which institutions can disclose data in their possession (compare 
e.g. SWIFT “case”). The current legal framework of most countries is not designed to 
deal efficient with the combating the financing of terrorism, because financial 
institutions must comply with five players: institutions, regulators, law enforcement 
agencies and society.  
 
 
5.2 General – Strategies for Combating Terrorism
19 
The threat of terrorism (and organized crime) to the world economy can be countered through 
the following six politico(-economic) measures:
20 
 
(1)  Combating poverty, especially in countries with fundamentalist religions; 
                                                 
19 See Winer (2002), Ware (2004), Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen and Klemmensen (2006), Lai (2007), Piazza 
(2008), Endres and Sandler (2002, 200&) and Indridason (2008). 
20 Similar recommendations are made by Krueger and Malecková (2003), Li (2005), Piazza (2008a), Abadie 
(2006), Li (2005), Li and Schaub (2004), Williams (2007) as well as Llussa and Tavares (2008). Page 26 of 34 
(2)  ensuring and strengthening democratic basic rights, freedom of speech, tolerance and 
openness; 
(3)  intellectual confrontation of (esp. radical) Islamism; financial support of moderate 
streams; 
(4)  law and order measures alone, like the death penalty, do not help since they turn 
terrorists into martyrers; 
(5)  complying with human rights when dealing with terrorists and a moderate rhetoric; and 
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